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INTRODUCTION
Research on ownership structures of multinational firms has only recently begun to investigate the influence of taxes on ownership chains and on location decisions for holding companies. Many aspects of the tax system have already been found to affect the use of foreign equity holdings, i.e. statutory tax rates, influence of tax havens and tax treaties and dividend withholding taxes. Due to their use of the worldwide tax system, the issue of dividend withholding taxes is of high importance for US firms. European countries however, use a territorial tax system, and no dividend withholding taxes are imposed for dividend payments among EU-member states. One aspect of the tax system that has so far been widely ignored in research is group taxation. Most European countries offer group taxation regimes, i.e. tax consolidation regimes that treat a group of majority-owned companies as a single entity for tax purposes, and allow for intra-company loss-offset. In this study, I investigate whether the introduction of a cross-border group taxation regime influences ownership chains of multinational firms.
Several strategies aimed at minimizing taxes, such as setting transfer prices, structuring internal debt, or shifting provisions can take place between any member of an ownership chain. In order to exploit tax benefits resulting from group taxation regimes, ownership chains of multinational firms have to meet certain criteria, i.e. they need at least one intermediate subsidiary in the country offering cross-border group taxation. If parent companies do not meet those criteria at the time the group taxation regime is introduced, they must restructure their ownership chains by either shifting existing subsidiaries or creating new subsidiaries.
In 2005, Austria implemented a new group taxation system, which allows for foreign subsidiaries to be included into a tax group. Additionally, all current tax losses of foreign group members can be offset against profits of other tax group members. In order to benefit from Austrian group taxation, foreign companies have to establish an Austrian intermediate subsidiary. From an international perspective, Austria's group taxation system is unique within Europe. Only two other European countries offer a group taxation system that allows for current tax losses of foreign group members to be offset against tax profits of other group members. In 2004, however, Denmark and Italy introduced such a cross-border group taxation system. Both countries use an all in-all out system with respect to the integration of foreign subsidiaries into the tax group, whereas Austria offers a cherry-picking system. Additionally, tax groups have to be established for a minimum of 10 years (Denmark) or 5 years (Italy) compared to 3 years in Austria. From a legal perspective, the Austrian group taxation regime is currently the most attractive cross-1 border group taxation system in Europe. For this reason, I expect foreign multinational firms to react to the introduction of the Austrian group taxation by restructuring their ownership chains and implementing Austrian intermediate subsidiaries in order to meet the requirements for Austrian cross-border group taxation.
Although it seems intuitive that multinational firms invested in Austria would structure their ownership chains in order to make use of the cross-border group taxation regime, several factors might prevent companies from doing so. Reorganizing subsidiaries is not free of cost, since subsidiaries have to be transferred among the ownership chain or new subsidiaries have to be established. Whereas the costs of shifting existing subsidiaries can be assumed to be rather small, establishing new subsidiaries in a country that the parent company has not previously been invested in definitely has costs associated. Not withstanding, tax benefits from group taxation rely heavily on having foreign loss-generating subsidiaries. If all subsidiaries in a tax group are profitable, however, tax payments of the group will correspond to the tax payments of the single entities and the cost of restructuring ownership chains will exceed the tax benefits stemming from group taxation.
My paper studies the effects of a specific tax law change on ownership chains. So far, studies have mainly exploited cross-sectional variance in tax rates, and changes in ownership structures as a reaction to the specific tax law change have not yet been analyzed.
I believe that the introduction of the Austrian cross-border group taxation system has been well perceived by multinational European firms, given its unique attractiveness, especially from firms that have already previously invested in Austria. Contrary to other papers studying the influence of taxation on ownership chains, I use data on ownership over time, in order to directly determine when and how ownership chains of multinational firms were restructured.
My setting allows me to observe ownership structures both for several years before and after the introduction of the cross-border group taxation system. To investigate the effect of cross-border group taxation on ownership chains, I use two different samples of 2,347 (1,602) multinational European parent companies, for which I can observe all subsidiaries within the first two layers of the ownership chain. I use a logistic model to estimate whether changes in ownership chains of multinational parent companies can be attributed to the introduction of the cross-border group taxation system in Austria. Since my analysis is based on a single country only, I have to apply a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to separate tax induced effects of group taxation, from simple time effects of multinationals increasing their number of subsidiaries over time.
My first analysis focuses on European parent companies that have already invested in 2 Austria prior to the tax reform. In order to meet the requirement for group taxation, these parent companies only have to shift subsidiaries along their ownership chain, and do not have to establish new subsidiaries in or outside Austria. To separate tax effects from time effects, I use two different control groups in my first analysis. My first control group consists of Austrian multinational parent companies; for these companies to benefit from cross-border group taxation, there is no need to establish an Austrian intermediate subsidiary, since the parent company itself can opt for group taxation. Using a DD approach, I compare ownership chains of non-Austrian and Austrian parent companies. I expect to observe changes in ownership chains only after the introduction of the crossborder group taxation regime, and only for non-Austrian parent companies. are higher for most multinational firms than the benefits resulting from the possibility to set off foreign losses among the members of a tax group.
My findings are useful for both, scholars and policymakers, because they provide insights into the effect of group taxation regimes on ownership chains. Additionally, they help in understanding why some firms react to the introduction of group taxation regimes and others do not. Research on the impact of taxes on location decisions of multinational firms has gained ongoing attention in empirical tax research (see Hines (1997) and Devereux (2006) for an overview of literature, and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) for a meta-study), but has always been focused upon the influence of corporate tax rates or corporate effective tax rates, not on the influence of group taxation regimes. The effect of taxes on ownership structures of US multinational firms has been recently investigated by Lewellen and Robinson (2013) and Dyreng et al. (2015) . Similar to Dyreng et al. (2015) Also my tax focus is on cross-border group taxation in Europe, rather than dividend withholding taxes. Among the few studies considering the influence of group taxation on corporate group structure, Oestreicher and Poppe (2007) , Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) and Dreßler and Overesch (2010) are related to my paper. They all analyze the link between group taxation systems and the probability of setting up a holding company in a country but unlike my study, they only consider one point in time. My study is not focusing on location decisions of holding companies. In fact, in order to make use of the intra-company loss-offset provided by group taxation, the Austrian group parent has to be an operating company, preferably generating profits. In addition, my focus is on changes in ownership chains due to changes in tax law with respect to group taxation. The most comprehensive recent analysis of the ownership structure of European multinational corporate groups is given by Koch and Oestreicher (2012) . In line with my results, they too show that the existence of a group taxation regime has a positive influence on the decision to implement intermediate subsidiaries. Again, the study is only using cross-sectional data, and is based on domestic subgroups. I am not focusing on domestic subgroups, but on changes in ownership chains for multinational firms.
Although I use the introduction of the Austrian group taxation regime for my analysis, my results and implications from the results are not limited to an Austrian context.
Since its introduction in 2005, the Austrian cross-border group taxation system has been mentioned as a landmark model for group taxation regimes in other countries (Schneider (2006) ), especially Germany. My results show that multinational firms, already invested in a given country, react to the implementation of a cross-border group taxation system by shifting subsidiaries to that given country. Allowing for cross-border group taxation systems can therefore be seen as a location advantage for countries. My findings provide empirical evidence that could be useful to governments in countries which are attempting to reform their group taxation regimes, or are implementing cross-border group taxation regimes for the first time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section shows how multinational firms have to restructure ownership chains in order to benefit from cross-border group taxation, and develops my research hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design, and details the data. Section 4 details descriptive statistics and the results from the tests of my hypothesis, section 5 concludes.
TAX EFFICIENT STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP CHAINS AND

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Corporate taxation within a group taxation regime differs from the standard model of taxation. This is because entities participating in a tax group are no longer taxed separately, rather their profits and losses are pooled at the level of the parent company for tax purposes. Domestic group taxation regimes allow for an offset of profits and losses of domestic subsidiaries at the parent company level, whereas cross-border (international) group taxation regimes allow not only for an offset of profits and losses of domestic subsidiaries, but also for an offset of (final and/or current) losses of foreign subsidiaries. This results in an immediate recognition of foreign losses that lowers the tax burden of the parent company as well as the tax group. Typically, losses are subject to recapture taxation once they are used by the foreign group member or if the foreign group member leaves the group, which results in a timing effect resulting from cross-border group taxation rather than a net effect on taxes.
In order to benefit from cross-border group taxation, a parent company must meet requirements with respect to its ownership chain. In this chapter, I describe how multinational parent companies have to change, or design their ownership chains in order meet the requirement for cross-border group taxation. The two examples presented in this chapter are taken directly from my sample.
The first example of restructuring refers to a parent company located in a country outside Austria that had at least one Austrian subsidiary prior to the introduction of the group 5 taxation regime. The first figure shows the observed ownership structure of a Swiss parent company from my sample in the year 2004: In the current state, the Swiss parent company cannot make use of the cross-border group taxation regime, since only Austrian parent companies can act as a tax group parent and it is not possible for sister companies controlled by a common foreign parent to form a tax group. Therefore, it has to restructure its ownership chain such as the Austrian subsidiary becomes an intermediate subsidiary. By shifting subsidiaries along the ownership chain, it is now possible for the Swiss parent company to opt for cross-border group taxation. Within the newly established tax group, Vetropack Austria Holding AG, the Austrian intermediate subsidiary acts as the tax group parent, and pooling of profit and losses is available for three tax group members (Vetropack Moravia Glass a.s., JSC Vetropack Gostomel and Vetropack Austria GmbH ).
Vetropack Moravia Glass a.s., the Czech subsidiary, that was directly held by the Swiss parent prior to 2005, is now indirectly held by the Swiss parent company via the Austrian intermediate subsidiary.
Two new subsidiaries, one in Austria and one in Ukraine, have been established.
Restructuring ownership chains as shown in figure 1 and 2 is not cost free. Therefore the costs of the restructuring have to be weighted against the benefits of cross-border group taxation. As already mentioned, cross-border group taxation allows for an immediate offset of current tax losses of foreign group members. This benefit has to be weighted against the cost of restructuring. In the case shown in figure 1 and 2, restructuring costs can be assumed to be relatively small, since they are limited to the transfer of the Czech subsidiary.
Recall that the restructuring process shown in figures 1 and 2 is tax-neutral, despite effects resulting from group taxation. Typically, dividend withholding taxes, levied on dividend payments from the subsidiary to the parent company have been found to play an important role in research on determinants of ownership chains (Koch and Oestreicher (2012) , Lewellen and Robinson (2013) and Dyreng et al. (2015) ). In my Given the new structure of the ownership chain, the UK parent can now make use of cross- 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test my hypothesis, I use a logistic regression that models the probability that a multinational European parent company holds at least one Austrian intermediate subsidiary after the introduction of the cross-border group taxation system in Austria.
I expect parent companies to employ one of the two restructuring processes described in chapter 2, depending on whether the parent company has already been invested in Austria before the introduction or not. In order to make sure that my results are not driven by time effects, I apply a difference-in-difference (DD) approach using two different control groups.
My first regression model deals with parent companies already invested in Austria before the introduction of the cross-border group taxation regime (shifting subsidiary strategy).
In the first specification, I use ownership chains of Austrian multinational parent companies as the control group. Contrary to non-Austrian parent companies, there is no need for an Austrian parent to change its ownership chain due to the introduction of crossborder group taxation, since the parent company itself can act as the tax group parent.
I therefore assume changes in the ownership chains of Austrian parent companies not to be driven by group taxation. Specification 1 reads as follows: Specification 2 reads as follows:
Since I compare the probability that a parent company holds at least one Austrian intermediate subsidiary to the probability that the same parent company holds at least one foreign intermediate subsidiary, every parent company enters my sample twice.
Therefore P robInter it is created out of two sub-variables: P robAInter it is an indica- the tax reform to be significantly higher than the probability that a multinational parent company holds at least one foreign intermediate subsidiary after the tax reform and therefore a positive coefficient for the DD estimator β 2 . All control variables used are the same as described in equation 1. My second regression model deals with parent companies who are not invested in Austria prior to the introduction of the cross-border group taxation regime (new subsidiary strategy). It reads as follows: Although I require parent companies to have at least one Austrian and foreign subsidiary in at least one of the years before the introduction of the cross-border group taxation regime, I observe a minimum amount of subsidiaries held of 0. This is due to the fact that some parent companies do not own subsidiaries in some of the years before the introduction of the cross-border group taxation regime.
The second half of My parent level control variables are all significant and have the expected sign. The positive coefficients for Size and Subsidiary show that the larger the firm (in terms of assets as well as in terms of number of subsidiaries), the higher the probability that it has at least one Austrian intermediate subsidiary. Loss-making firms cannot access tax benefits arising from cross-border group taxation, which is why I observe the expected negative and significant coefficient for P rof it.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE 2 -NEW SUBSIDIARIES
Parent companies that have not been invested in Austria prior to 2005 have to establish an Austrian intermediate subsidiary in order to benefit from cross-border group taxation.
In Table 5 . Standard errors are presented in parentheses and allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the parent company level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Equ.
(1) Equ.
(2) P robAInter P robInter T reatment -2.088** -2.3068** -1.828* -1.8375*** -2.3426*** -2.3830*** (0. This table reports descriptive statistics for sample 2 for all variables used in the regression analysis. The dependent variable is P robAInter, the probability that a multinational parent company holds at least one Austrian intermediate subsidiary, which takes the value 1 if the multinational parent company holds at least one Austrian intermediate subsidiary and 0 otherwise. T reatment is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for foreign (that is, non-Austrian) parent companies and 0 for Austrian parent companies. Size is the natural logarithm of the parent company's total assets, P rof it is the parent company's earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and Subsidiaries is the total number of subsidiaries directly and indirectly held by the parent company. Table 9 . Standard errors are presented in parentheses and allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the parent company level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
